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Misunderstanding or Misdirection?:  
Whistleblower Protection in Queensland 
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Introduction 
 
In his report into corruption in Queensland, Fitzgerald listed whistleblower protection as a 
necessary part of a strong governance regime. "What is required is an accessible, 
independent body to which disclosures can be made, confidentially (at least in the first 
instance) and in any event free from fear of reprisals."1 It was one of the reforms studied by 
the Electoral and Administrative Review Committee, the report of which resulted in the 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (WPA). 
 
The need for whistleblower protection was supported by all sides of Parliament.2 The 
Premier, Wayne Goss, in his Second Reading Speech on the Public Sector Ethics Bill3, said 
that that Act and the WPA would form a package with the former outlining required behaviour 
and the WPA encouraging staff to report wrongdoing. 4 The WPA was subsequently passed 
and has remained virtually unamended for over a decade. Such consistency is either an 
indication of skilled drafting and effectiveness or the fact that the Act has been neglected. It is 
the hypothesis of this paper that the latter is the case. This hypothesis will be tested by 
examining the sincerity and diligence with which the Act has been treated during, and 
following, its passage.  
 
If a government was genuine about the WPA being a significant part of a reform package, and 
they supported this package, they would take certain steps: 
• Firstly, Members promoting the passage of the Bill, would have ensured that they fully 
understood the Act’s terms and operation, and that it would actually encourage and 
protect whistleblowers; 
• Secondly, if you believed in the ideals of a piece of legislation you would not 
undermine the ideals with hypocritical actions; and 
                                                 
1 Fitzgerald G E 1989, Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council, Queensland 
Parliament, p.134. 
2 At this time there was no National/Liberal coalition. Denver Beanland (Lib) drew the connection 
between the system and good public administration: “Protecting and encouraging whistleblowing is 
therefore not just a moral duty; it is part of ensuring good government, that being efficiency and efficacy, 
honesty, integrity, commitment to public service, openness and accountability…” Beanland, QPD, 17 
November 1994, p.10497 
3 This Bill was introduced on the same day as the Whistleblower Protection Bill. 
4 Goss Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 17 November 1994, pp.9688-9689. 
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• Finally, once you had passed the Act you would want to establish whether or not it 
was being complied with, by collecting data and determining success or failure. By 
doing so you could check on its correct implementation and amend its provisions to 
ensure its most effective application. 
 
These points will be examined in turn, mainly through reference to Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates and annual reporting and correspondence from the Office of Public Service Merit 
and Equity (OPSME), which administers the WPA. 
 
Background 
 
The WPA provides mechanisms for the protection of public servants, and in some cases 
members of the public, who disclose official misconduct, maladministration, mismanagement 
leading to a waste of public funds, and dangers to public health and safety. However, the 
protections only accrue to a person who makes such disclosures within the system of their 
own agency or to another agency which could investigate them. While it was not illegal to ‘go 
public’ with allegations, if you do so, theoretically, you forfeit the benefits of the Act.5  
 
The protections are substantial. Two protections apply to prevent the actions of others: 
• A whistleblower cannot be sued defamation or prosecuted for breaching confidentiality 
(s.39); 
• It is unlawful for a person to make a reprisal against a whistleblower (s.41).  
 
The other four provide courses of action for the whistleblower: 
• A whistleblower can apply to be transferred to another agency, if there is a continued risk 
of reprisal (s.46); 
• A whistleblower can sue for damages suffered from a reprisal (s.43); 
• A whistleblower can apply to the Industrial Commission for reinstatement should a 
reprisal include being dismissed (s.47). This option also exists under unfair dismissal 
laws; and  
• A whistleblower can seek an injunction to restrain a reprisal (s.48). 
 
However, the quality of a law has no effect if not implemented. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Though the Act does allow you to retain many of the protections if you disclose both internally as well 
as publicly. 
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Sincerity of the Government 
 
The Goss Labor Government presented and passed the Bill in 1994. A number of speakers 
from both sides of the House discussed the Bill.6 There was the normal political scramble for 
the moral high ground as each side provided cases of whistleblowers who had suffered 
reprisals while the other side held power.7 Within the debate there is a disconcerting lack of 
knowledge of the content of the Bill. Added to this is the exposure of intent by the 
Government to reduce the effectiveness of previous proposals for a system of whistleblower 
protection that encouraged disclosure to one which retains government control over the 
release of information. 
 
Lack of Knowledge 
Under the WPA a whistleblower’s motivation is irrelevant. A whistleblower receives the 
protections regardless of their reasons for making the claim as long as they had a bona fide 
belief in the truth of their allegations at the time of disclosure.8 There are no references to 
motivation in the Act from which someone could even wrongly draw an implication that this is 
the case. Yet many government Members keep referring to matters of motivation, as if 
“malicious” persons would not be protected.  
 
Both the Premier and Clem Campbell (ALP) stated that the Bill was not intended to protect a 
group of “mischievous”, “self-proclaimed” whistleblowers who they referred to as “trumpet 
blowers”. Such persons were, they believed, ‘un-Australian dobbers’ and did not deserve 
protection. 9 Tom Barton (ALP) added a further category, the “malicious”, being those who 
seek to cause harm to another’s reputation, and use the WPA as a tool to pursue their 
personal agendas.10 Barton also said that Bill did not protect “those who deal in trivia which is 
of no interest to anybody other than themselves and [the Bill] does not seek to protect those 
people who are self-appointed whistleblowers on behalf of others.”11 He indicated that this 
group included those who refuse to accept that their perception of corruption has not been 
vindicated.12 Vaughan (ALP) agreed saying: “Some so-called whistleblowers remind me of 
Batman and Robin, Zorro or even Don Quixote. They seem to have the same drive to fight 
                                                 
6 Please note that Queensland only has a Lower House, the Legislative Assembly, as the Upper House, 
the Legislative Council, was abolished in 1922. Consequently, the debates discussed are limited to the 
Legislative Assembly. 
7 Grice, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10488; Cooper, p.10506; Campbell, p.10507; 
8 Sullivan, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10494. 
9 Campbell, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10507; Goss, p.10513. 
10 Barton, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10485; see also Vaughan (ALP) at p.10489. 
11 Barton, QPD, 17 November 1994, pp.10482-10483. 
12 They were, he said, like community organisations who complained that governments did not consult 
enough: “Unfortunately, some people think that consultation means that the Government has to continue 
talking to them until the Government agrees with exactly what they are putting forward. It does not mean 
that. Nor does it mean that the Government tells people what it is going to do and that is the end of it. 
Consultation falls fairly well in the middle of that.” (Barton, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10483 which is 
tied into whistleblowers specifically at p.10485.) 
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evil and wrongdoing wherever it exists, whether real or imaginary.”13 The future Premier, 
Peter Beattie similarly complained of “frivolous, malicious and vexatious complaints”.14 The 
Premier said that the Bill aimed to specifically differentiate between these categories and 
genuine cases: 
This legislation seeks to strike a balance to protect the genuine whistleblower and 
encourage evidence and complaints of wrongdoing, criminal and official misconduct 
to be brought forward, but not at the expense of giving an absolute blank cheque to 
malicious muck-rakers to defame with impunity the reputation of innocent citizens.15 
 
However, malice or mischievousness would only be relevant if a person intentionally provided 
false or misleading information which is an offence under the Act. In addition, even if a person 
pursues a disclosure after seeing no result or vindication, there is no provision for their 
exclusion from the terms of the Act. The only time exclusion could occur is if they had been 
presented with evidence that a reasonable person would regard as reversing their bona fide 
belief in the truth of their claim.  
 
It appears that the Government Members, including the Premier, misunderstood a 
fundamental consideration in the operation of the WPA. Given the advantages of pointing out 
flaws in the Government’s argument, we must assume the Opposition failure to correct the 
Government Members is a sign that they were equally unaware of the mistake. Consequently, 
it is also possible to conclude that the Bill was not a high priority for either side. 
 
Politicisation 
The Leader of the Opposition, Rob Borbidge, claimed the Bill would increase politicisation: 
“This Bill is more about protecting the Goss Labor Government from disclosures by 
whistleblowers than it is about protecting whistleblowers, the public interest, or ensuring good 
public administration.”16 The Opposition alleged that the Bill would do so by ensuring political 
correctness and punishing disloyalty: 
It soon became obvious that whistleblowing, which reached an art form during the 
Fitzgerald inquiry, would no longer be politically correct... Goss Labor has embarked 
on a long, drawn-out and permanent purge of those who would dare to dissent.17 
 
He and other Opposition Members claimed the Bill was part of a campaign of ensuring that 
public servants were made aware that they would be punished for disloyalty.18 Grice said that 
the government had already implemented a policy of reviewing the logs of all phone calls 
made through the government network to ensure no one called the Opposition. “[The] rule is 
that a public servant belongs body and soul to the Australian Labor Party. A public servant 
                                                 
13 Vaughan, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10489. 
14 Beattie, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10500. 
15 Goss, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10513. 
16 Borbidge, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10477 
17 Grice, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10486. 
18 They claimed that an officer from the Office of State Revenue had already been disciplined for using 
his work phone to call the Leader of the Opposition’s office. Fitzgerald later asked why the officer’s 
phone had been monitored in the first place. (p.10510) 
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should forget any ideas of individual identity and any right of contact with anyone who is not 
politically correct.” 19 The primary means of control provided under the WPA was the 
obligation on public servants to making disclosures “in-house”. 20   
 
The Opposition claimed this in-house system would not only contain information but would 
also discourage whistleblowing through frustration: “There is room for them to be given the 
run around, fobbed off and counselled out of the disclosure.”21 The Government had 
downgraded the Fitzgerald vision of “encouraging” whistleblowers, to simply a desire to 
“promote the public interest by protecting persons who disclose” information. Borbidge found 
further evidence of discouragement in the exclusion of systems to provide support and 
counselling for whistleblowers. The Liberal Party also pointed out the failure to provide 
counselling for whistleblowers, despite recommendations to this effect by EARC and the 
Parliamentary Committee22, to help them deal with the stresses involved in coming forward.23  
 
Perhaps this omission was based on some extraneous reason such as funding. But if this is 
the case then it applied across the board, as none of the Queensland ethics based legislation 
encourages emulation. The Public Sector Ethics Act 1994 and the Public Service Act 1996 
both contain the virtues of good public administration that, if instilled, should reduce 
maladministration. But, like the WPA, their success relies on the genuine implementation and 
maintenance of the obligations and principles. No rewards or support are provided for those 
who comply. 
 
Other flaws were raised by the Opposition and Liberal Party, but they do not stand up to 
scrutiny. Borbidge said the “most disappointing aspect” of the Bill was that it did nothing to 
relieve the “fear” of reprisal on the part of whistleblowers.24 This is unfounded as the one thing 
the Act does provide is a good package of protections and offences that, if enforced, would 
stop or punish those who commit acts of reprisal. 
 
A further weakness of the Bill pointed out by the Liberal Party was the failure of any 
requirement to investigate a matter once it has been disclosed.25 But if the WPA is read 
complementarily with other legislation this is untrue, as the Criminal Justice Act required 
CEO’s to pass on suspicions of misconduct to the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). 
However, the Liberals claimed that the Opposition and the public service generally had little 
faith the CJC because they saw it as a bastion of Labor lawyers. They preferred Fitzgerald’s 
                                                 
19 Grice, QPD, 17 November 1994, pp.10486-10487.  
20 Borbidge, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10477. He said the Bill was: "do not rock the Goss Labor 
Government boat" or "let's keep disclosures in-house" whistleblower legislation.” 
21 Borbidge, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10476 
22 The Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee was charged with the oversight of the operations of 
EARC and made reports on the reports published by the Commission. 
23 Beanland, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10497: he went on to say at p.10498 that public servants lived 
in fear of the CJC. 
24 Borbidge, QPD, 17 November 1994, pp.10476-10482 
25 Santoro, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10493. 
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original idea of an independent body to deal with disclosures.26 Of course if the CJC could be 
politicised through patronage then this new body could be as well. 
 
Blowing the Whistle to the Media 
According to the Government, open disclosure to the media, was not supported in order to 
prevent defamation of innocent parties by false disclosures.27 Vaughan pointed out that 
nothing in the Bill prevented a person going to the media; it simply would exclude such a 
person from the operation of the protections under the Bill.28 There is no provision in the Act 
which excludes a person who went to the media. The protections, other than defamation, are 
tied to reporting internally. A person who first reports internally, and later makes an external 
disclosure, would still receive the other protections. Of course an internal disclosure can still 
defame but the extent of the exposure of the defamatory material can be contained. 
 
The Parliamentary Committee, like EARC, was willing to allow disclosure outside the public 
service in exceptional circumstances. They recommended that anyone could make a 
disclosure outside the government, including to the media, when there was an “immediate 
danger to the health or safety of the public.”29 Borbidge said that the Opposition supported 
this provision,30 and added that a public servant who had reported to all available channels 
and seen no result should be able to approach the media and/or the Opposition as a last 
resort. He did not support full access to the media but noted that the Fitzgerald Inquiry came 
about due to frustrated public officials going outside channels to reveal what they knew.31  
 
Barton agreed that the exposure of corruption under the previous government was due to 
“genuine whistleblowers”, and acknowledged the “positive and crucial role” of the media at 
that time. But he distinguished the contemporary situation on two grounds. Firstly, the Goss 
government was not corrupt. This is a circular argument. Whistleblowing is only needed when 
the government is corrupt. Historically, corruption and maladministration in Queensland has 
mostly been uncovered by whistleblowers going to the media or the Opposition. Thus the best 
means for disputing Barton’s claim of honesty is the very mechanism he says this honesty 
makes redundant.  
 
Secondly, Barton said that in the 1980’s there were no “official avenues” for whistleblowing 
other than going to the media. Now that the Bill provided alternatives, the media was no 
longer a necessary option.32 However, neither the Bill, nor the final Act, provided new 
                                                 
26 Beanland, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10497: he went on to say at p.10498 that public servants lived 
in fear of the CJC. 
27 Barton, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10483 
28 Vaughan, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10489; and Goss p.10514. See also Sullivan (ALP) at p.10494 
who questions the need to provide protection for an honest person who goes to the media. This may be 
true for defamation but would not help them when faced with reprisal. 
29 Get reference 
30 Borbidge, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10478 
31 Borbidge, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10479 
32 Barton, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10483.  
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avenues for making an internal complaint other than recommending agencies set up a 
process for dealing with disclosures. The only new body, and therefore avenue for 
complaints, was the CJC.33 The Opposition pointed out that the existence of these and other 
independent organisations under the current Labor government did not guarantee protection 
for those who had blown the whistle.34 
 
The only other reference to a procedure in the Act is s.27(2) that requires a whistleblower to 
follow a “reasonable” internal procedure should one be developed by an agency. This last 
section is actually a restriction on whistleblowers as it can invalidate a claim for protection if 
the disclosure is not made in the correct manner. The establishment of a complex, poorly 
understood system could provide an agency with the means of excluding a potential 
whistleblower that fell foul of many potential breaches of procedure. 
 
To sum up the Opposition argument, by leaving the government in control of the 
whistleblowing process, only providing protection and not facilitation or encouragement, the 
Bill was a political exercise to appear to fulfil a Fitzgerald reform promoting the type of 
behaviour it professed to protect. By failing to provide for these factors in the Bill, Borbidge 
said that: “the white horse of accountability is off to the knackery courtesy of the likes of the 
honourable members who sit opposite and the Premier, who in charge of this legislation.”35 
On the other hand, the Opposition was in power within two years of this debate and did 
nothing to remedy the many issues it identified in 1994. 
 
Hypocrisy  
 
Current Ministers of the Beattie Government making public statements in regard to 
whistleblower issues have demonstrated a poor understanding of the Act by themselves, and 
presumably, by their advisors. There has been a preoccupation with shooting the messenger 
in the form of the whistleblower rather than dealing with the allegations made in their 
disclosure. Arguments proceeded in the press after two incidents in which Ministers named 
whistleblowers in Parliament. Both ministers sought and obtained, after the fact, legal 
protection based on the parliamentary privilege overriding the legislation.36 The Courier Mail 
                                                 
33 The Public Sector Management Commission was a new body that could take disclosures, but it really 
only replaced the Public Service Board. 
34 Fitzgerald, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10510.. 
35 Borbidge, QPD, 17 November 1994, p.10481. Another National Party member, Grice said at p.10486: 
“This Bill should be called the ‘Whistleblowers Gag Bill’ or even the ‘Whistleblowers Persecution Bill’…” 
Cooper, the former National Party Premier, said at p.10504: “If I had stood in this place prior to the 1989 
election as Premier and tried to introduce this Bill, the then Labor Opposition and the media would have 
had another feeding frenzy at my Government's expense. I would have been derided as trying, in my 
dying days as Premier, to both gag public service critics and, at the same time, to make a pitch for votes 
on the basis of a reform and accountability platform. The simple fact is that all of those criticisms would 
have been true—and if they would have been true then, they remain true now.” 
36 Torpy K 2001 ‘Nurses denounce whistleblower – Leukaemia ward on defensive,’ The Courier Mail, 6 
December 2001, p.4; Parnell S 2003 ‘Spence in strife over name gaffe,’ The Courier Mail, 16 October 
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criticised the then Health Minister Wendy Edmond for ‘demonising’ a genuine whistleblower in 
her department.   
Every public servant in Queensland has now been indirectly told that the Beattie 
Labor Government is prepared to abuse parliamentary privilege and expose 
whistleblowers to political attack for no good reason. Surely that means that potential 
whistleblowers now have a good reasons to have second thoughts.37 
 
No one pointed out the fact that the passing of the names of the whistleblowers to the 
Ministers could also be regarded as a breach of the Act.  
 
Supervision 
 
Supervision is an essential element in ensuring that an Act is implemented. Without steps to 
ensure effective application of its principles, an Act is nothing more than public relations. The 
WPA contains internal accountability mechanisms in the form of two separate reporting 
requirements. Firstly, under s.30(2) each public sector entity must report on how many 
disclosures it receives each year and how many were verified.38 Secondly, under s.31 the 
Minister with responsibility for the Act, in this case the Premier, must report each year to 
Parliament “on the administration of this Act”. The word “administration” is rather vague. 
Fortunately, the Explanatory Memorandum for the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 
provides guidance: 
Clause 31… The purpose of this is to enable the Minister to provide Parliament with 
an overview on how the Act is being implemented across public sector entities and to 
raise any issues concerning the Act’s administration. 
 
Thus there are two components to s.31 reporting: firstly, an overview of implementation of the 
Act across government; and secondly, a critique of any issues in relation to the Act’s 
administration. Given the number of entities involved, this would require a substantial amount 
of work including annual surveys of all agencies and possibly a standing working party to 
discuss and review issues. Fortunately this is facilitated by s.29(3) which requires all agencies 
to record the name of the whistleblower, the information disclosed and the action taken, and 
s.31(3) requires agencies, when asked by OPSME, to provide assistance with reporting on 
administration. However, the reporting has only occurred in a cursory manner and, even then, 
only in the last few years. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2003, p.4; and Potter D 2003 ‘Whistleblower probe clears MP,’ The Courier Mail, 25 October 2003, p.14. 
The two Ministers were Wendy Edmond and Judy Spence.  
37 Franklin M 2001 ‘Sharp pitch to whistleblowers,’ The Courier Mail, 8 December 2001, p.26. The same 
government then went on to eject from their party a whistleblower who had implicated other party 
members in electoral fraud, further indicating a willingness to take action against those who make 
damaging claims against the party or government (Osborne P 2003 ‘Labor member expulsion 
hypocritical, says Opposition,’ AAP Australian News Wire, 6 October 2003.) 
38 ‘Public sector entities’ is defined very broadly in Sch.5(2) to cover over 400 different 
government bodies including all departments, local governments and statutory authorities 
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No reports under s.31 are contained in the annual reports of the Office of the Public Service 
Commissioner from 1994 to 2000, or those of the Office of Public Service Merit and Equity 
(OPSME), as the OPSC became in 2000, from 2000-2002. However, the 2001-2002 Annual 
Report states that departments were reminded of their requirements under s.30 to report in 
their own annual reports.39 
 
The OPSME claims that the s.31 reporting requirements are met in the annual report of the 
Public Service Commissioner.40 In 2002-2003 the annual report stated: 
In assisting the Premier to fulfil responsibilities under the Whistleblowers Protection 
Act 1994, the OPSME has provided advice to departmental officers on the application 
and implementation of the Act, particularly the reporting and recording requirements 
for public disclosures.41 
 
This is neither a report of what was going on across agencies nor an analysis of the success 
or failure of the whistleblower regime. In the following year the same sentence, less the final 
clause, was provided as sufficient to meet the obligations under the Act. Perhaps the OPSME 
believes that this really is sufficient.42 Consequently, stating that nothing is being done to 
administer the Act beyond the provision of advice would constitute full reporting under s.31. 
This is confirmed in a letter to the author from Premier Beattie of July 2005 which states: 
The reporting requirement under section 31 of the Act has been met… by a brief 
general statement about the administration of the Act published in the Annual Report 
of the Public Service Commissioner.  
 
While technically the OPSME is making a report on the administration of the Act, they are not 
providing any administration. No follow up on implementation was provided. No analysis was 
conducted of the operation of the Act in agencies or its effectiveness. No analysis was even 
performed on the statistics provided by the agencies in their reports. 
 
Whistleblowers Information Sheet 
In 2003 the OPSME published a web document entitled Information Sheet – Whistleblowing: 
Answering your questions about making a Public Interest Disclosure. This document presents 
a plain English version of the Act. However, in doing so it provides a version that is 
significantly tighter than the provisions of the Act. Three points should be made: 
                                                 
39 OPSME 2002, Office of Public Service Merit and Equity Annual Report 2001-2002, Brisbane, p.3. 
This was repeated at p.8. This is not to imply that this is all the OPSME had done. The OPSME provided 
advice on the Act through a hotline; discussed the application of the Act in the Queensland Public 
Sector Ethics Network (QPSEN); and somewhat ambiguously, “… provided advice to departmental 
officers on the application and implementation of the [WP] Act, particularly the recording and reporting 
requirements for public interest disclosures.” (OPSME 2002, Office of Public Service Merit and Equity 
Annual Report 2001-2002, Brisbane, pp.22-24.) They continued the same activities in the next two 
financial years. (OPSME 2003, Office of Public Service Merit and Equity Annual Report 2021-2003, 
Brisbane; OPSME 2004, Office of Public Service Merit and Equity Annual Report 2003-2004, Brisbane) 
40 O’Farrell G, Acting Public Service Commissioner, correspondence with the author, 17 November 
2003. 
41 OPSME Annual Report 2002-03, p.24. 
42 This seems unlikely given the OPSME’s other responsibilities to uphold the Public Sector Ethics Act 
1994 including its ethical obligation of ‘diligence’. 
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1. The Information Sheet states that you can make a disclosure of information “giving 
rise to a genuine concern” about misconduct. This is misleading. Section 14 of the 
WPA states that you only need to honestly believe on reasonable grounds that the 
information you have “tends to show the conduct or danger”. The wording genuine 
concern implies a stronger onus on the discloser and ignores the contingency that the 
person need only believe it at the time of the disclosure; 
2. The document explicitly states that a disclosure can only be made in accordance 
with the Act and that people are “required” to do so. The Act does not require anyone 
to make a disclosure in a particular format; it just provides that protection will only be 
given to those who comply with the Act. Thus you can blow the whistle by any other 
means you wish but you will not fall under the Act; 
3. The Information Sheet states that it is “mandatory” under the ethical obligations of 
the Public Sector Ethics Act to make disclosures relating to misconduct and 
maladministration. This is untrue as the obligations themselves hold no force. As 
s.5(3) states: “The ethics obligations are intended to provide the basis for codes of 
conduct for public officials and are not of themselves legally enforceable.” 
 
It is not possible to say conclusively whether the contents of the Information Sheet are wrong 
out of intent to narrow the application of the Act or mere lack of diligence in its preparation. 
But neither cause demonstrates care and concern for the operation of whistleblower 
protection in Queensland.  
 
Parliamentary Committee Call for Review 
In 2001, the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee (PCJC), as it was then, noted that no 
one had been charged with breaching the WPA or had been subject to an injunction under its 
provisions. This is still the case today.43 They concluded that a possible reason for this 
situation is that: “the Act is not being utilised effectively.” The Committee said that the Act will 
not work unless agencies were committed to its principles.44 This commitment would not exist 
without “sector-wide oversight of agencies’ whistleblower reporting and support mechanisms” 
to ensure the Act is genuinely implemented and exercised. However, it noted that no agency 
was specified as having this responsibility under the Act, and the obvious choice, the 
OPSME, had not taken up the role.45 
 
                                                 
43 The cases that have dealt directly with the Act have not related to offences under the Act. These 
include: Howard v. State of Queensland [2000] QCA 223; Reeves-Board v Qld Uni of Technology [2001] 
QSC 314; and Ambrey v Oswin [2005] QCA 112. 
44 PCJC 2001 Three Yearly Review of the Criminal Justice Commission, Queensland Parliament, 
Brisbane, p.141. The Committee also noted the CJC’s concerns over the perceived distrust of the Act by 
the average public official. 
45 PCJC 2001, p.142. 
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The OPSME had, and still has responsibility “to the Premier” for the administration of the 
Whistleblower Protection Act 1994.46 As ‘lead agency’ for the Act the OPSME is responsible 
for its implementation and supervision. As the author stated as a witness, representing the 
Public Service Commissioner, before the PCJC in December 2000: 
…whilst we work with the CJC and with other agencies in relation to whistleblowing, 
we do not supervise their detailed actions. We have the responsibility over the 
Whistleblowers Protection Act, but most of our responsibilities are in relation to policy 
and education rather than the application and detail within agencies.47 
 
With regard to a proper review of the administration of the Act, the author advised the 
Committee: 
…we have not done a review of how the individual agencies have conducted their 
application of whistleblowers, so it would be hard to give a commentary on how well 
they are operating. I am not saying that is not part of our responsibility; it is just 
something that has not occurred as yet, and it is something that we have on the list of 
things that we are doing.48  
 
Despite the then Director-General of the Department of Premier and Cabinet stating that there 
was no need for a review of the Act49, the Committee recommended an extensive review of 
whistleblowing across all agencies.50 The Review would cover the role of the lead agency; the 
nature and need for oversight of the Act’s implementation and operation; training and support 
(including whether they should be legislated); the formation of an inter-agency committee and 
liaison between the CJC and the lead agency; whether further research was required; and the 
sufficiency of annual reporting and parliamentary oversight. In its March 2001 report the 
PCJC noted that OPSME had advised that it was working on two reports: one on the 
administration of the WPA, due in February 2001; and a best practice review of 
whistleblowing.51 In its March 2004 report the now Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct 
Committee (PCMC) stated that, while the Government replied to the 2001 recommendation 
that it would give consideration to a review, no action either in accordance with the OPSME 
submission or Recommendation 33 had been taken at that time. Consequently, it again 
recommended that a review be undertaken in the same terms.52 In his letter to the author of 
16 May 2005 the Premier advised that a review in accordance with the recommendations of 
the 2004 Report was underway. However, the OPSME reported in its 2005 Annual Report, 
published October of that year, that the review would be delayed until the conclusion of the 
                                                 
46 www.opsme.qld.gov.au (viewed 22 February 2006) 
47 Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee 2000 Transcript of Hearings 14 December 2000: Three 
Yearly Review of the Criminal Justice Commission, Queensland Parliament, Brisbane, p.57. At the time 
I was a Senior Policy Officer in the OPSME. 
48 PCJC 2000, p.57. 
49 PCJC 2001, p.149. 
50 PCJC 200, Recommendation 33. 
51 PCJC 2001, pp.149-150.  
52 PCMC 2004 Three Year Review of the Crime and Misconduct Commission, Queensland Parliament, 
Brisbane. 
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report of the Bundaberg Hospital Commission of Inquiry. At this date, April 2006, there is still 
no report on this matter.53 
 
The OPSME is now doubly neglectful as even if they carry out the review requested by the 
PCJC, it does not remove their obligations under the WPA to report annually. A report to a 
parliamentary committee is not a substitute for complying with an annual reporting obligation 
under a statute. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has established that the Queensland Government has not been genuine in its 
introduction and implementation of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994. As has been 
stated earlier, a government that fully supported such legislation: 
• Would have given sufficient time to the Bill to fully understand its contents and 
implications; 
• Would not act in a hypocritical manner in relation to the provisions of the Act; and 
• Would ensure that the implementation of the Act was supervised sufficiently to 
guarantee its proper and effective operation. 
 
The Goss Government was deficient in its handling of the Act by mistaking the terms of the 
Bill and making promises about its effects which were untrue. The Borbidge Government, 
after having made clear their complaints about the inadequacies of the Act, did nothing to 
rectify them whilst in office. The Beattie Government has also done nothing to identify or 
address shortfalls in the legislation, and if anything, has shown itself to be willing to allow 
Ministers to breach the Act from the safety of Parliamentary Debates. 
 
Finally, the OPSME, the lead agency for the Act, has demonstrated its disregard for its 
responsibilities under the WPA. It has not gone to agencies and checked on the quality of 
policies in relation to whistleblowers. No one is establishing that the Act is being implemented 
correctly. No one is determining whether all agencies even fully understand the provisions of 
the Act. And no one is reviewing the Act to determine whether it is working and/or how it can 
be improved. The agency has therefore failed not only in its own responsibilities under the 
Act, but also in responses to promised separate reporting to the Parliamentary Committee. In 
not reviewing or analysing the reporting of other agencies, the OPSME is failing to ensure that 
whistleblowers are actually being protected. The OPSME has failed to carry out its statutory 
obligations and sent a message to the Queensland public sector that no one will be 
                                                 
53 In 2004-2005 the OPSME became and industry partner in the Griffith University study – Whistling 
while they work: enhancing the theory and practice of internal witness management in public sector 
organisations. (OPSME 2005, Office of Public Service Merit and Equity Annual Report 2004-2005, 
Brisbane, p.18) Commendable as this may be, it also does not meet their reporting requirements.  
 
 13 
monitoring the performance of individual agencies in their own implementation and 
maintenance of the obligations. Under such a regime the basis is laid for breaches of the Act 
to be ignored and its intent to be overridden. 
 14 
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